On June 10, 2010, the Florida Supreme Court granted review of Corey v. Corey, 29 So.3d 315 (3rd DCA 2009) and held that there is no presumption for or against rotating custody (timeshare).
For years there was a presumption against rotating custody, but in 1997 the law changed.
After the 1997 change in the law, the courts continued to find a strong presumption against rotating custody. In the Corey case, the Third DCA disagreed with other Florida appellate courts and held that because there is nothing in the statute regarding a presumption the sole issue under the statute whether to order or approve an agreement for rotating custody is whether it is in the best interest of the child.
Because Section 61.121 has been repealed and superseded by the massive timeshare revamp in 2008, some might conclude that the issue is gone. What about a rotating timeshare? Nothing significantly different about that. The new statutory provision, F.S. Sec. 61.13 (2)(c)(1), provides, “It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of child-rearing. There is no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.”
Since it mandates that no timesharing schedule carries a favorable or unfavorable presumption, arguably rotating timeshare should be resolved solely on the best interest test.
